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The Emotional Public Sphere and Its Importance:  





Bournemouth University, UK 
 
The concept of the emotional public sphere is outlined and illustrated by contrasting 
phantasies of the state in the public mind. The dilemma frequently encountered around 
the principle of freedom of speech—when to prohibit speech that threatens the freedom 
or security of others—is explored as a problem of managing toxicity in the emotional 
public sphere. It is proposed that the aim of such management should be the 
containment of toxic feelings, both those expressed by the speaker and those evoked in 
the audience/targets of the speech. To that end, moral intolerance is distinguished from 
existential intolerance, the latter being a form of response to hate speech that does not 
allow the emotions it expresses to be engaged with and thereby contained. The work of 
containment is seen to go beyond the decision to permit or proscribe, and to involve the 
news media and framing practices. Analogous to psychotherapeutic work with 
individuals, a default orientation toward permitting speech is suggested, although this 
requires contextual provision of measures to contain its effects.  
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Introduction: What Is the “Emotional Public Sphere”? 
 
In the relatively limited discussion that there has so far been of the term emotional public sphere, 
some different meanings have emerged. It has been used to refer to the general performance of emotion 
in public (Lunt & Stenner, 2005), which is one aspect of the emotionalization of everyday life and is an 
important feature of contemporary culture. Alternatively, I have used it (Richards, 2007, 2011) to refer to 
the emotional substrate of democratic politics, the domain of public emotion in which the activities of the 
political public sphere are always and inevitably embedded. Given the increasing interpenetration of 
politics and popular culture, this meaning of the term—which is the one I pursue here—reaches far into 
mediatized popular culture (see also Lunt & Pantti, 2007; Pantti, 2011). By public emotion, I mean the 
emotions of the public, whether they are publicly expressed or not. The dynamics of this emotional 
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domain are often a major factor in determining the directions and outcomes of political processes, 
whatever the content and institutional locations of those processes.   
 
The 2015 symposium organized by colleagues at the University of Navarra, on which this Special 
Section is based, was an indication of the growing interest in the concept of the emotional public sphere 
and an opportunity for its further development. The concept brings a psychological dimension to a major 
idea in sociopolitical theory, and as such illustrates the potential of the emergent interdisciplinary area of 
the psychosocial1 for enriching our understanding of society and politics. 
 
The psychological theory with which I attempt to understand the dynamics of the emotional 
public sphere is post-Freudian psychoanalysis (see, e.g., Kernberg, 1976; Klein, 1975; Mitchell, 1988; 
Sandler, 1993). It cannot be assumed that all of the emotions involved will be fully and easily visible, 
either to members of the public in question or to observers; we are quite often in the territory of 
unconscious emotions. Typically, the core emotions involved will be the fear, rage, and resentment 
associated with experiences of loss, abandonment, rejection, and humiliation. They will also include guilt 
and envy. Depending on the levels of emotional capital present in a specific public, they will also include 
the positive, prosocial emotions of love, remorse, and concern, derived from a basic outlook of trust in the 
world. Of course, we could deliberate at length on what the list of core emotions should include; the 
indicative list just offered is based on post-Freudian accounts of early emotional development, but other 
interpretations of those accounts, and other psychological theories, will generate variations on that list.  
 
The source of these emotions in the individual is not directly political, but is in the early 
experiences of primary relationships with caregivers and significant others. However, at all points in later 
life, they are mobilized in the individual’s dealings with the world, in personal relationships, leisure, work, 
and other aspects of social being. Their mobilization around political issues and influence on the 
individual’s conduct as a citizen is what constitutes the emotional public sphere. A key point is that there 
is a systemic quality to this emotional public sphere. Developments in one part of it will affect parts 
elsewhere; all individuals within the public concerned are part of it, and both contribute to (albeit for many 
people only in face-to-face settings) and are influenced by it. As in the mind of the individual, certain 
feelings can be partitioned off, disowned, or buried, but they will continue to exert influence through their 
underlying pull on public experience and through the defenses used to conceal or avoid them.  
 
For example, as the ultimate authority in our adult lives, the state is especially likely to be seen 
through the prism of early experience of parental authority. Both neoliberal denigrations of the state and 
classical socialist idealizations of the state can be seen as expressions, in part at least, of what Kleinian 
psychoanalysts call unconscious phantasy, in this example, extreme images of parental figures. These 
phantasy images are a strong presence in the emotional public sphere, and can influence our perceptions 
and opinions in a number of important areas in which fundamental feelings about the state are involved. 
One such area is freedom of speech. The American legal scholar Ronald Krotoszynski (2015) notes that 
the exceptional commitment to freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment to the U.S. 
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Constitution is not a product of positive belief in the benefits of unrestricted speech, but of a fear that if 
government were allowed to restrict speech, it would do so in ways that promoted a sectional interest. A 
negative attitude, distrust of government, is the driver, not a positive belief in the benefits of freedom. 
When legal theorists defending maximum freedom of speech have seen it as based on a positive, they 
have typically invoked a market model: Freedom of speech will lead to the best ideas winning in an open, 
adversarial competition between all ideas. There is another type of idealization involved here, one stated 
very clearly in the works of Hayek and other market champions, of the market as an omniscient, 
omnipotent force, a deity-type image that is the complement to that of the evil state. So when the state–
market axis is viewed from within the split world of Kleinian infantile experience, one end (you choose 
which) is seen as good and bountiful and the other as evil and heartless, with a profound split between the 
two. 
 
There may still be some resistance today, especially in highly rationalistic forms of political 
science, to the idea that emotion is important in politics as anything other than an occasional although 
dangerous intrusion. But the “affective turn” in the social sciences has meant that many academics would 
now take it for granted that emotions are integral to political processes. In this respect, academia may 
just have caught up with what most nonacademics would think. Minimally, the concept of the emotional 
public sphere can be a sort of checklist heading to make sure that we have considered the emotional 
forces at work around whatever political topic we are studying. But we can ask more of it beyond this 
descriptive utility. How may it be deployed in a focused way to deepen understanding of specific issues 
and contribute to clarifying or resolving issues of policy and practice?   
 
Free Speech and Toxicity 
 
One area in which this concept may throw new light on a problem is that of freedom of speech, 
where there has not been much psychologically informed academic work of any sort. Some survey data 
give starting points for psychological inquiry, for example, the national differences reported in a Pew 
Research Center study (Poushter, 2015) and the (unsurprising) finding of Naab (2012) that although 
supporting the freedom of speech principle in the abstract, people can be less ready to apply it to voices 
with which they deeply disagree. Two studies (Cowan & Khatchadourian, 2003; Downs & Cowan, 2012) 
report that women are more sensitive to the harm of hate speech than men and regard freedom of speech 
as less important. This gender effect is mediated by empathy. However, most academic work in the area 
is, predictably, from a legal perspective, although an important strand in that work focuses on the 
psychological issue of dignity. From what is a minority position among scholars, defending restrictions on 
freedom of speech, Heyman (2008) and Waldron (2009) analyze “assaultive speech” as an attack on 
dignity and argue for the need to moderate freedom with protection from such attack.  
 
An influential principle in the legal scholarship is that of consequentialism, according to which the 
“consequences” of any particular speech should give a basis for determining whether or not that speech 
should be proscribed by law or be denied a platform. Sometimes, a consequence can be seen clearly in 
people’s outward behavior. For example, it can be argued that some forms of threat and abuse should be 
proscribed because they function to reduce the freedom of speech enjoyed by others, as seen in the 
withdrawal from public discourse by those threatened.  
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This is the argument put forward by, for example, legal academic Anita Bernstein (2014), who 
builds a case for a certain kind of censorship by noting that some women have stopped writing online, or 
have much reduced it, because of the abuse they have received from aggressive male sexists. They have 
suffered emotional distress, and in some cases have incurred the costs of security measures, and in the 
end they decide it is not worth it. So, a definite behavioral consequence can be seen to flow from a set of 
speech acts. Freedom of speech for some is fear and silence for others, or as the title of Bernstein’s article 
puts it, extending an established saying to the online environment, “Abuse and harassment diminish free 
speech.” 
 
This is a strong point, and could be decisive if the consequences of freedom of speech were to be 
assessed behaviorally. But what about other consequences with less measurable overt effects? What if 
consequences were understood to include long-term and complex effects within the emotional public 
sphere? The first such consequences to come to mind might be ones that reaffirm the rightness of banning 
speech that silences others. The emotional consequences of unchecked bullying are likely to be damaging: 
higher background levels of anxiety, loss of trust in authorities who could stop the bullying, and perhaps 
also more intense animosity toward the bullies and deeper social polarizations. What about the 
consequences of an intervention that outlawed the bullying speech? Here, we would expect the benefits of 
feelings of greater safety and reduced anxiety and of trust and gratitude toward the intervening 
authorities, as well as the possibility that some abusers may be faced with the seriousness of what they 
have been doing, and may themselves then want to desist anyway. But we could also think about some 
possible adverse consequences. These might include a different sense of fear, linked to the knowledge 
that although something threatening has been shut out, it still exists, perhaps now in less known forms. 
On the other side, the bullies themselves, and the possibly substantial numbers of those whose 
sentiments the bullies express, may feel resentment at being suppressed, and instead of feeling contrition 
and remorse, may widen the target of their hostility to include the censoring authorities and may adopt 
more extreme attitudes. Also, any public controversy over the proscription may act to raise the profile and 
bravado of the abusers. Overall, then, denying freedom of speech to Internet trolls and other bullies may 
also serve to raise levels of fear and of hostility, at the same time as it brings respite to some of their 
victims. 
 
The basic question here can be framed in terms of toxicity. We are talking about toxic effects 
within the emotional public sphere, and my suggestion is that in making decisions about whether or not a 
particular type of speech should be censored, it would be helpful to apply a consequentialist approach to 
the emotional public sphere, and thereby to consider the emotional costs and benefits of different choices: 
increasing toxicity (emotional damage and social polarization) or decreasing it (building emotional capital 
and social cohesion). That means examining the types and degrees of toxicity that the unfettered speech 
exudes, and those that would be produced by prohibiting it.  
 
Introducing the concept of the emotional public sphere into debates about freedom of speech is a 
step forward. It focuses on emotional consequences and approaches them at the level of a whole and 
complex entity, the emotional public sphere, rather than trying to weigh and compare a range of discrete, 
separate consequences for certain individuals or groups. The concept of emotional toxicity strengthens 
this systemic approach by suggesting the power of written or spoken messages to circulate poison (or an 
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antidote) through the whole system. This organic analogy, which has classical origins in the notion of the 
“body politic,” needs to be handled with caution, but has a useful resonance here, invoking as it does a 




However, there are different types of toxicity. Does the speech in question try to evoke fear, 
resentment, or hatred? Which groups in society are likely to be most vulnerable to it? What is the 
likelihood that its influence will interact with or potentiate other toxic forces? There is no simple, single 
measure of the toxicity that a particular piece of speech may bring into the system, or of how different 
groups in society would respond to its being banned. The difficulty of deciding on the best course of action 
increases when we acknowledge that the decision to allow or to prohibit a platform of any kind (an event, 
website, tweet, or whatever) is not all there is to it. That decision is only a starting point. Let us examine 
this point with reference to an example I have written about in more detail previously (Richards, 2013). 
Six years ago in Britain there was a brief but very intense public debate about an invitation issued by the 
BBC to the then-leader of the British National Party (BNP) to appear on the current affairs television 
program Question Time. The BNP was then the nearest thing we have had in Britain for many decades to 
a substantial political force with clear racist and neofascist leanings. Its leader Nick Griffin had initiated a 
strategy to refashion the BNP as a populist, electable party. He would have had great difficulty in finding a 
university where he could speak, but here he was invited on the back of strong results in European 
Parliament elections to a platform signifying full involvement in the national conversation. 
 
Many people objected vehemently to this. In the event, Griffin performed disastrously, coming 
across as a dishonest and incompetent figure. This triggered within the BNP a challenge to his leadership; 
the party imploded, its public support tumbled, and it has not recovered since. So, it might seem that it 
was a good thing to give Griffin a platform, to expose him for what he is.  
 
Nonetheless, that overlooks another aspect of the program. However unimpressed some BNP 
sympathizers may have been by Griffin’s behavior, it is likely they would have felt at least equally strongly 
about the way he was, it might be said, “set up.” One questioner after another put questions to him that 
were not questions but accusations or dismissals. The panelists all ensured they attacked him at some 
point, and the one next to him sat with her back partly turned toward him. The chair, an eminent 
broadcaster, joined in the general attack on several occasions. It could easily be seen as an ambush 
carried out by a left-liberal elite and planned by the BBC. Those in the television audience for whom Griffin 
might have been seen as someone speaking to their anxieties about immigration and cultural change 
could have been excused for retaining some sympathy for him in face of the onslaught and for thinking 
that, yes, the complacent ruling elite never listen to those living hard lives at the bottom of the pile. So, 
although the program could be seen as contributing to a detoxification by revealing the ugliness of a 
fundamentally antidemocratic party and triggering its decline, it may also have deepened the rift between 
an anti-BNP majority of the public and those who had some sympathy for it (i.e., people who felt that the 
BNP, unlike any other political party, had some sympathy for them) by adding to the toxic resentments of 
the latter. 
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This points toward the importance, when we are discussing whether or not to give airtime or 
platforms to extremist opinions, of how the broadcast or event is managed. The decision to include an 
extremist voice on a platform is not the end of the deliberation, as what should follow is careful 
consideration of the dynamics of the platform and of its relations with the audience.  
 
At no point in the Question Time program did anyone raise the question of why the BNP had 
secured nearly 950,000 votes (6%) in the last elections for the European Parliament. It was as if its 
message was an intolerable one that could only be exposed and attacked in order to annihilate it. 
Although Griffin’s presence was some sort of acknowledgment that the BNP, its ideology, and its support 
existed, this acknowledgment was disavowed during the program itself. The broadcast exchanges 
represented an attempt to repress rather than contain the social forces that the BNP represented.  
 
Intolerance and Containment 
 
The above conclusion may seem to tend toward some kind of acceptance of racist propaganda, as 
opposed to the intolerance shown toward it by the Question Time program. But there are two kinds of 
intolerance here. Let us call one moral intolerance, whereby a statement is seen to be unacceptable. The 
prohibition of certain types of expression by law embodies this principle, and implies that there is social 
harm caused by some statements. We may also find statements that fall below the threshold of illegality 
unacceptable in this sense because we have reason to believe they cause significant harm to some people 
or to society as a whole, even though our legislature has not proscribed them. 
 
The other we could call existential intolerance because it refers to an inability to tolerate the fact 
of the existence of the message and the approval it receives from some people. This is a psychological 
phenomenon, at the core of which is an anxious wish to deny. It is a state of mind, not a moral principle. 
It is probably a very common phenomenon given that the mind characteristically seeks to escape from 
unpleasure and much extremist propaganda is highly unpleasurable to many people. This kind of 
intolerance is a major impediment to making good decisions about restricting freedom of speech because 
it will pull away from any effort to assess the overall impact of a restriction on the emotional public sphere 
and toward imposing the restriction in order to avoid confronting an unpalatable reality. Its opposite is 
perhaps best not termed existential tolerance because that would suggest being content for the views in 
question to exist and to be expressed. The opposite of existential intolerance is rather the capacity to 
tolerate the fact that they do exist, and to explore and engage with that reality. 
 
Although these two types of intolerance may frequently present in blurred combination, they are 
in principle very different. To clarify this difference, let us return to the concept of the emotional public 
sphere, and ask whether it can be elaborated in a way that bears helpfully on decisions about whether to 
allow certain statements to be made, and how to manage situations in which the freedom of speech is 
being exercised controversially. 
 
Can the concept be used to develop a normative principle, that is, to throw some light on the 
conditions in which democratic institutions and processes would most thrive? What helps most in the 
emotional life of a public to strengthen a peaceable democratic polity? By analogy with the individual, I 
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suggest that it is containment. By this I mean a state of affairs in which people can feel recognized, in the 
psychological sense that their feelings are acknowledged and understood, and existentially tolerated by 
some person or persons. Second, effective containment will enable people to feel “safe.” Safety is a 
complex feeling; its conditions include physical security, but also a basic trust that the social environment 
is an emotionally safe one. Without containment, good-enough psychic functioning is hard to achieve, 
whether we are talking about individuals or large collectives such as national publics. I am drawing here 
on the post-Freudian psychoanalytic theory of containment, according to which it has two necessary 
elements. These are the acknowledgment of feelings, however distressing or dangerous they may seem, 
and the provision of experience which gives confidence that such feelings can be tolerated and managed 
(Hinshelwood, 1989, pp. 244–246).  
 
The problem with what I have called existential intolerance is that it undermines the possibility of 
containment. It allows only one response to disturbing views, which is to banish them, rather than to 
manage them on the basis of a realistic acceptance of the fact that some people do hold them. The aim of 
containing toxic views does not necessarily mean “engaging” or negotiating with those who hold them, but 
rather points to the need for ways of neutralizing or dissolving them in the minds of their adherents. 
Although in some cases this may be achieved, or happen spontaneously, on an individual basis, at a 
societal level, it will mean the mobilization of resources and dynamics within the emotional public sphere. 
What might this mean in relation to the question of free speech on university campuses? 
 
Some Problems in Challenging Extremist Ideology 
 
Since 2015, UK universities have been required by law to be proactive in countering the 
possibility that violent extremist ideology might have an influential presence on their campuses. 
Accordingly, they are now required to make decisions about whether or not to offer a platform to an 
extremist speaker, and to manage those occasions when a platform has been granted by ensuring that 
speakers with extremist views are accompanied by speakers who challenge those views within the same 
event. However, “challenging” could mean the kind of existential intolerance that, I am arguing, will not 
necessarily provide the most effective response. A lot will depend on the effectiveness of the opposing 
speaker. The exchange may leave unaddressed the sources of the sympathy for extremism that will be in 
the minds of some members of the audience, and may add to the perverse romance of vilification, the 
“allure of the bad object” as psychoanalysis has called it (Armstrong-Perlman, 1994), and the sense of 
heroic outsiderness, which are among the drivers of “radicalization.”  
 
The government guidelines have another potential shortcoming; their object is to prevent the 
direct radicalization of individuals through their exposure to extremist propaganda. They do not address 
the ideological “collateral effects”: the complex, systemic, and possibly long-term impact of extremist 
speech on the wider emotional public sphere. A simple “ding-dong” or boxing match between one view 
and another is unlikely to leave any long-term “containing” influence within ongoing public discourse, and 
may even strengthen the appeal of the toxic ideology by confirming the Manichean worldview on which it 
is likely to be based. 
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UK government thinking on the dynamics of violent jihadist propaganda is inadequate in another 
respect. Then-Prime Minister David Cameron, introducing new counterterrorist measures in October 2015 
(Boffey, 2015), spoke of how certain speech can “plant the seed of hatred,” suggesting he held a 
“hypodermic” model of message reception (albeit with a horticultural twist). Or, to return to the organic 
metaphor, radicalization is seen as comparable to contamination through contact with an external carrier 
of a toxin. In contrast, an understanding of the emotional public sphere would appreciate that the seeds of 
hatred are already planted, as they are intrinsic to both individual and collective psychology. There are 
always psychic toxins circulating in the psyche. Psychological well-being is not a sheer absence of 
destructiveness and hatred, but successful management of toxins and of potential malignancies. The 
question is whether they will grow and colonize the mind, and in what way. All the forces present in the 
emotional public sphere are potential influences on them, whether these forces act to contain them or to 
offer them public expression and shape them in the violent jihadi cause. 
 
What would be needed for a more fully containing approach to the speech of jihadists, today’s 
most pressing example of “dangerous speech” (Maynard & Benesch, 2016), if we are mindful of the 
overarching dynamics of the emotional public sphere? The most obvious aim would be to contain the 
impulses and anxieties of those “vulnerable” to recruiters for terrorism, so that they found other less 
destructive ways of managing their insecurities and rage. An equally important aim would be to address 
the positive attractions of extremist propaganda in order to dilute its effect among wider audiences, and to 
reduce the silent or collusive support for terror that does exist in the wider population, especially among 
some young Muslims.  
 
This is a very difficult area. Polling data going back over a decade have consistently shown that, 
especially among the young in many countries, there are substantial levels of support and sympathy for al 
Qaeda and ISIS, for visions of a global caliphate, for replacing democratic with sharia law, and for 
pursuing those aims with violence. For example, an international survey by the Pew Research Center in 
March–April 2013 found levels of support among Muslims for suicide bombing exceeding 10% in eight of 
the 11 countries surveyed, ranging from 12% to 62%. Although these figures were substantially below 
some levels recorded in earlier years, they suggest a significant limit on the global consensus against 
terror, especially when seen in the context of a median level of 13% support for al Qaeda across all 11 
publics.  
 
Looking closely at this phenomenon may arouse fears that “widening the net” of counterterrorism 
will cast a shadow of surveillance over ordinary, likeable young people who will never become a “Jihadi 
John” or “Jihadi Jane” (Halveson & Way, 2012). Moreover, drawing attention to wider projihadi sentiment 
is a risky move in a context in which it is widely seen as necessary to impress on the non-Muslim public 
that violent extremism is a perversion of Islam pursued by only a small minority. The need to counteract a 
generalized Islamophobia is clear, but the cost of doing that exclusively would be a failure to confront the 
breadth and depth of the problem.  
 
Arguably, one of the key features of the emotional public sphere, when viewed systemically, is 
the production of climates of feeling and thresholds of acceptability. If that is so, it lends support to the 
views of those who see the collusive or explicit support for violent fundamentalism among some Muslim 
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youth, even when it clearly stops short of any direct involvement, as a major part of the problem, perhaps 
even more fundamental than the availability of “vulnerable” individuals ready for death. Due to the 
political sensitivities involved, the media seem to find this especially difficult to deal with in a productive, 
containing way. So, when the problem is acknowledged, it typically bursts out in a very uncontaining, 
alarming way. For example, in July 2015, the Daily Mirror (overall perhaps the most restrained of the UK’s 
notorious “redtop” press) reported on a national UK poll by the respected polling organization ICM that 
had found that 9% of the population reported having favorable views of the Islamic State (an increase of 
2% on the same poll conducted in 2014). With some questionable arithmetic, the Mirror worked out that 
this might mean that half of the UK adult Muslim population supported ISIS and made this its initial 
headline (Sommerlad, 2015).  
 
Two months later, the Mirror’s rival paper The Sun repeated the performance with a poll that it 
claimed showed that “Nearly one in five British Muslims has some sympathy with those who have fled the 
UK to fight for IS in Syria. The number among young Muslims aged 18–34 is even higher at one in four” 
(The Sun, 2015, para. 1). This article rapidly attracted a record number of complaints to the Independent 
Press Standards Organisation (albeit only in that body’s brief 14-month history) and profuse criticism from 
many quarters. The polling agency involved also distanced itself from the interpretation and use of its data 
in this fashion, but The Sun stuck to the line that this was a disturbing reality that had to be faced. 
 
Yet, so inflammatory were these headlines that we might be forgiven for thinking that the whole 
topic should be avoided, to contain the anxieties and anger it might evoke, which is one explanation for 
the record number of complaints to the Independent Press Standards Organisation. However, effective 
containment must start with acknowledgment and existential tolerance. This would involve acknowledging 
the scale of sympathy for violent fundamentalism, whatever it might be, and a readiness to explore the 
nature and power of the attractions that ISIS-style propaganda presents. These include what we might 
see as the broadly positive yearnings for a secure and respected identity, embedded in a stable social 
environment, and for a sense of purpose and moral certainty. Some recruits (perhaps a majority) suffer 
from a tyrannical moralism rather than a compulsive hatred, so there is little point in telling them that 
what they are doing is wrong. They are doing it precisely because they are convinced it is right. They need 
to hear their certainty challenged from a different direction, one that acknowledges and explores the 
reasons for their choice. At the same time, the perversion of moral sense, and the attendant guilt, that 
their choice involves has to be acknowledged. 
 
Online projects to develop “counternarratives” and to “combat extremist ideologies” are 
proliferating and will hopefully have some effect. But their reach and impact are unlikely to match that of 
the mainstream and social media. Whether or not a particular speech act occurred in a containing context, 
there is another opportunity in the news production process for it to be contextualized in a way that helps 
contain the toxicity of the speech. The news media arguably remain the single most important power in 
the emotional public sphere. Of course, online material can always be found on its own terms, unmediated 
by any news frame, but for its consumers, the news is a potentially containing factor, depending on what 
it has to say about the speech act, the speaker, the implications, consequences of the act, and so forth. If 
the news can facilitate some thought about the speech in question, it may help to contain the feelings 
around it. “Thought” would mean some examination of the feelings it conveys, of the possible sources of 
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those feelings, and of how they could be existentially tolerated and socially managed so as not to lead to 
further conflict and insecurity. Such an approach would be very different from that taken in the examples 
discussed above, and would be one that would expand the capacity for existential tolerance in the 




I have used the concept of the emotional public sphere to frame a discussion of some of the 
issues of the day around freedom of speech. This has moved us away from an exclusive focus on the 
speech itself, and the harm it may cause, toward an examination of how and to what extent the speech 
concerned may appeal to sections of the public. I have argued that the context and management of the 
“speech event” may be as important as the content of the speech itself in determining its consequences. 
This argument, if accepted, would support the adoption of a general default principle with which to 
approach debates about freedom of speech, which is that anything legal should be permitted, provided 
that its expression can be managed in such a way that the overall impact of the speech event will be to 
some degree containing.   
 
Prohibiting speech because it gives offense is not a way forward given that offense can easily be 
claimed (George, 2016). Nor does the opposite approach of simply requiring complainants to develop 
“thicker skins” stand up well when considered in the context of the emotional public sphere and its 
systemic circulation of feelings: Speech has effects beyond the speech situation. Empathic alertness to the 
emotional dynamics of speech must address both its potential appeal and its potential harm. 
 
Containment will require the emotional appeal of the speech to be recognized and examined. 
Both extreme right wing ideologies and violent jihadism appear to have significant bodies of sympathy and 
support in the wider population. However, in neither case is this sympathy easily addressed in mainstream 
political discourse. Its fundamental psychological drivers are the same in both of these groups, and the 
existence in a society of substantial pools of deep insecurity and aggression is not a comfortable topic, so 
it readily attracts existential intolerance. In the case of sympathy for jihadism, there is an additional 
problem in that attending to its existence risks deepening anxiety and animosity toward all Muslims. 
Again, the practice of therapeutic work provides some guidance here for policy and practice in a 
sociopolitical context: Positive change is going to be more likely if repression is challenged, if the toxic 
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